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Planning a 'slum free' Trivandrum: housing upgrade and the rescaling of 
urban governance in India 
Glyn Williams, Umesh Omanakuttan, J Devika and N Jagajeevan 
Abstract 
dŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌĞǆĂŵŝŶĞƐŚŽǁ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƵƌďĂŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂŐĞŶĚĂŝƐƌĞƐŚĂƉŝŶŐrelationships 
between national, State and city-level governments. JNNURM, the flagship programme that 
heralded a new era of urban investment in India, contained a range of key governance 
aspirations: linking the analysis of urban poverty to city-level planning, developing holistic 
housing solutions for the urban poor, and above all empowering Urban Local Bodies to re-
balance relationships between State and city-level governments in favour of the latter. Here, 
ǁĞƚƌĂĐĞ:EEhZD ?ƐŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ<ĞƌĂůĂ ?ƐĐĂƉital city, Trivandrum (Thiruvananthapuram), 
ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐĚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƐĞĚƵƌďĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĂŶĚƵƐĞŽĨ ‘ƉƌŽ-ƉŽŽƌ ?ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŽ
implement housing upgrade programmes could have made it an exemplar of success. In 
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?dƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵ ?Ɛ ‘ĐŝƚǇǀŝƐŝŽŶŝŶŐ ?ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŚŽƵƐŝŶŐƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐŝƚŚĂƐƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶŚĂǀĞ
ĨĂůůĞŶƐŚŽƌƚŽĨ:EEhZD ?ƐůŽĨƚǇŐŽĂůƐ ?dŚĞĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĞŵƉŽǁĞƌŝŶŐĐŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚ
retaining centralised control embedded within this national programme, and the unintended 
city-level consequences of striving for JNNURM funding success, have reshaped urban 
governance in ways not envisaged within policy. As a result, JNNURM has been important in 
rescaling governance relationships through three interlinked dynamics of problem framing, 
technoůŽŐŝĞƐŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƐĐĂůĂƌƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŽĨĚƌŝǀŝŶŐƌĞĨŽƌŵ ‘ĨƌŽŵĂďŽǀĞ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ
ŚĂǀĞĞŶƐƵƌĞĚƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐŽĨƵƌďĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ
in India. 
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1 Introduction: Ǯǯscaling of governance practices 
To improve urban infrastructure and provide urban services for the poor, we need urgently 
ƵƌďĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞƌĞĨŽƌŵ ? ?ŝƚŝĞƐ ?Śave not been able to look inward and build on their 
inherent capacities, both financial and technical, and instead are still being seen in many States 
ĂƐ ‘ǁĂƌĚƐ ?ŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?dŚŝƐƐŚŽƵůĚĂŶĚƚŚŝƐŵƵƐƚĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? 
WƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌDĂŶŵŽŚĂŶ^ŝŶŐŚ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚ at the launch of JNNURM 03/12/2005  
(Source: Sivaramakrishnan, 2011a: Annexure III)   
From the turn of the Millennium in India, increased national attention on urban development 
has coalesced into a consistent and clearly-articulated agenda to turn cities into engines of 
economic growth and to reduce urban poverty. The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal 
Mission (JNNURM), this ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ?Ɛflagship programme during ManŵŽŚĂŶ^ŝŶŐŚ ?ƐhŶŝƚĞĚ
Progressive Alliance governments (2004-15), was backed by INR 500 Bn (US$75 Bn) of central 
government funding (Kundu, 2014), a level of investment unprecedented in /ŶĚŝĂ ?Ɛ urban 
history. This paper focuses on :EEhZD ?Ɛ evolving aspirations for poverty-alleviation, examining 
its effects on slum improvement in Trivandrum (Thiruvananthapuram), the capital of the south 
Indian State of Kerala.1 Much of the existing literature on JNNURM outlines its inception and 
development (Sivaramakrishnan, 2011a, b), or reviews its progress and impact at the aggregate 
scale (Mehta and Mehta, 2010; Patel, 2013; Vidyarthi et al., 2013). Here, we instead use 
ŐƌŽƵŶĚĞĚŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐŝŶƚŽ:EEhZD ?ƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶto understand how it is reshaping governance 
practices. As Manmohan ^ŝŶŐŚ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚĐůĞĂƌůǇŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚ, the Mission went beyond delivering 
improvements to city infrastructure or urban services for the poor, and explicitly aimed to 
reform and empower urban governments. dŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌ ?ƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŚŽǁĂƌĞ
national projects of urban reform reshaping relationships between national, State and city-level 
                                                     
1 dŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌǁĞƵƐĞ ‘SƚĂƚĞ ?ƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐƉƌŽǀŝŶĐŝĂůĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞƵŶŝƚƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ<ĞƌĂůĂ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƐƚĂƚĞ ?
without a capital letter to refer to institutions of government more generally. tĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƌĞĨĞƌƚŽ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐĐŝƚŝĞƐďǇ
ƚŚĞŝƌƌĞǀŝƐĞĚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůŶĂŵĞƐ ?DƵŵďĂŝ ?ĞƚĐ ? ) ?ďƵƚƌĞƚĂŝŶ ‘dƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵ ?ĂƐŝƚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐŝŶĐŽŵŵŽŶůŽĐĂůƵƐĞ ? 
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governments. Accordingly, our starting point is the growing literature on state rescaling within 
contemporary India.  
Since the 1990s, centralised management of /ŶĚŝĂ ?Ɛeconomy has loosened under market 
liberalisation, but instead of the formal decentralisation to local rural and municipal 
government envisaged within revisions to its Constitution, India has witnessed the growing 
power of its subnational States (Kennedy, 2017). States have had greater scope to promote and 
regulate economic growth, often competing with each other through industrial subsidies, and 
the development of land (Sud, 2017) and infrastructure (see also Jenkins, 1999; 2014). This 
process has been indirect and somewhat haphazard, and as Shaktin and Vidyarthi (2013) note, 
it has also had dramatic city-level consequences, including the transformation of the real estate 
market (Searle, 2013) and the establishment of elite policy networks (Sami, 2013; Vidyarthi, 
2013; Weinstein, 2014a). As liberalisation has unfolded, opportunities for real estate 
development have expanded massively, alongside linked pressures from local middle class and 
ĞůŝƚĞŐƌŽƵƉƐƚŽ ‘ŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐĞ ?ƚŚĞŝƌĐŝƚŝĞƐ (Weinstein et al., 2013). These newly-empowered actors 
ŚĂǀĞĂŝŵĞĚƚŽĐƵƌƚĂŝůƚŚĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉŽŽƌǁŝƚŚŝŶƵƌďĂŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐĂŶĚ ‘ƌĞĂůŝǌĞĂǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨĂŶ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂůůǇĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞĐŝƚǇ ? ?^ŚĂŬƚŝŶĂŶd Vidyarthi 2013: 24, see also Chatterjee, 2004). 
JNNURM has played complex and contradictory roles within these changes, and by exploring 
these we contribute to the literature on state rescaling. Existing research has particularly 
concentrated on how States and city-level elite networks have sought new spatial strategies to 
capture private investŵĞŶƚŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ĂĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ƐƵƉƉůǇƐŝĚĞ ?ƚŚĂƚ
complements studies of the post-Fordist transition in Western economies (Brenner, 2009). But 
/ŶĚŝĂ ?Ɛ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐĂƌĞĂůƐŽƵŶĚĞƌŐŽŝŶŐƐĐĂůĂƌƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?ŵĂŬŝng
work on the changing geographies of welfare equally important (Landy, 2017; Vijayabaskar, 
 ? ? ? ? ) ?sŝũĂǇĂďĂƐŬĂƌŶĞĂƚůǇƐƵŵŵĂƌŝƐĞƐƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨ ‘ĚĞŵĂŶĚƐŝĚĞ ?ƌĞƐĐĂůŝŶŐĨŽƌ^ƚĂƚĞ
governments  W  “ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƚĞŶƐŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐĐĂƉŝƚĂůƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝncentives like tax 
concessions and cheap land and providing welfare to the electorate as a route to sustaining 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ʹ ĂŶĚŽƵƚůŝŶĞƐdĂŵŝůEĂĚƵ ?ƐƉƌŽĂĐƚŝǀĞďƵƚƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůůǇ-exclusive 
welfare regime as a response to this. Looking at JNNURM potentially extends this work by 
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ƌĞŵŝŶĚŝŶŐƵƐŽĨƚŚĞŽŶŐŽŝŶŐƉŽƚĞŶĐǇŽĨ ‘ůů/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐĨŽƌǁĞůĨĂƌĞĂŶĚŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ
reform,2 and in particular highlights three further tensions they set in train by reasserting this 
national scale of intervention. First, this standardises the policy problem to be solved (in our 
case, making /ŶĚŝĂ ?Ɛcities  ‘ƐůƵŵfree ? ), meaning that the local prevalence, form or causes of 
these problems may differ greatly from those imagined in New Delhi. Second, whilst 
programme implementation is usually devolved to State and/or local government, finances and 
rules for this are set nationally, resulting in struggles over technologies of governance (in our 
case, the seemingly mundane practices of plan-making and project approval). Third, and more 
particular to our case, JNNURM self-ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐůǇƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽƌĞĚƌĞƐƐ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐůĂĐŬŽĨ ‘ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵů
ƌĞƐĐĂůŝŶŐŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨůŽĐĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?through a scalar strategy: 
enforcing from above an ordered decentralisation to enhanĐĞĐŝƚŝĞƐ ? governance capacities 
(Shaktin and Vidyarthi: 2013). The literature has not addressed the scalar contradictions all 
three unleashed, but these are of potential significance for studies of governance reform far 
beyond the urban Indian context.   
This paper provides a context-ƌŝĐŚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ:EEhZD ?ƐƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ ?ĞǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŽůĞƐŽĨƐƵď-
national constellations of institutions and actors in shaping policy outcomes. Empirically, it 
focuses on Trivandrum for two reasons. First, much recent critical governance scholarship on 
urban India has centred on its  ‘ŵĞƚƌŽs ? ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĞůŚŝ ?Datta, 2012; Dupont, 2011) and 
Mumbai (Kennedy and Zérah, 2008; Weinstein, 2014a,b), but also Bengaluru, Chennai, and 
Kolkata (Arabindoo, 2011; Ellis, 2012; Harriss, 2010; Roy, 2004; Sami, 2014): Trivandrum, at 
around 950,000 population, provides a useful counterpoint to this  ‘ŵĞŐĂĐŝƚǇ ?dominance. 
Second, it is a city with the potential to realise :EEhZD ?ƐƉƌŽŵŝƐĞŽĨĞŵƉŽǁĞƌĞĚ ?ŝŶĐůƵƐŝǀĞ
government: Kerala has been a pioneer of democratic decentralisation (Heller et al. 2007), and 
Trivandrum has been controlled by leftist parties since the Millennium.  
                                                     
2 Ever since Indira Gandhi campaigned ƚŽ ‘ZĞŵŽǀĞWŽǀĞƌƚǇ ? ?Garibi Hatao) in the 1970s, the unveiling of new  
welfare programmes has been an important tool for national governments to build electoral support (see 
Corbridge et al, 2004: Chapter 2 and Appendix 1). 
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The paper opens by examining the governance practices that JNNURM sought to instil: 
democratic decentralisation, holistic city-level planning, and devising effective housing 
solutions for the urban poor. These practices are intertwined with forms of control  W funding 
conditionality and centralised project scrutiny  W through which central government disciplines 
cities towards these objectives. It then examines how Trivandrum reworked this  ‘ƌĞĨŽƌŵ ?
agenda as it drew down central government funding for housing upgrade. The focus here is on 
the planning processes that these programmes aimed to instigate, and the design and selection 
of the housing projects they brought to Trivandrum. What emerges is a City Corporation 
strategically engaging with national policy in search of financial support and reputational gain, 
but which becomes reshaped through this interaction in unanticipated ways.  
We draw upon a variety of data sources to investigate this interplay of national policy and city-
level response. We began with extended qualitative research (2013-17) within a settlement 
undergoing JNNURM in-situ upgrade where intensive community-based oral history work and 
interviews with those ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ?ƐŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ provided a rich 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨĂƐůƵŵĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇĂŶĚhow upgrade was experienced  ‘ĨƌŽŵďĞůŽǁ ?
(Williams et al, 2015; Devika, 2016). >ŽŽŬŝŶŐ ‘ƵƉǁĂƌĚƐĂŶĚŽƵƚǁĂƌĚƐ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ
community, we investigated :EEhZD ?Ɛnational handbooks and guidance notes, and 
dƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞƐĞ PŝƚƐCity Development Plan (TMC, 2006a), Slum Free City Plan 
of Action (DMG Consulting, 2014), and the Detailed Project Reports through which it sought 
funding for particular low-income housing developments. To understand :EEhZD ?Ɛrole in 
effecting governance change at a city level, in 2016-17 we interviewed experienced 
practitioners across differing layers of the state. These included former mayors and high-level 
administrators, those inside and beyond Trivandrum Corporation responsible for day-to-day 
implementation of slum improvement projects, and those people shaping and experiencing its 
housing projects at the community level.  
2 Reshaping governance for Ǯǯ 
/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐƵƌďĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇhas sought to eliminate slum conditions in parallel with reforming urban 
governance, restructuring city finances and promoting rapid economic growth. Key moments in 
WůĂŶŶŝŶŐĂ ‘ƐůƵŵĨƌĞĞ ?dƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵ 
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its development included the 2005 launch of JNNURM itself, the National Urban Housing and 
Habitat Policy (MHUPA, 2007), and the expanded JNNURM-II (2011-15) which called for  ‘ƐůƵŵ
ĨƌĞĞĐŝƚŝĞƐ ?3.  This agenda responded to a consistent diagnosis by academics, consultants and 
policy makers of underlying structural constraints on /ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐƵƌďĂŶdevelopment potential: 
chronic under-investment in infrastructure, urban poverty, the under-supply of legally 
developable land, and the need for empowered municipal governments (Planning Commission, 
2008, 2013; McKinsey, 2010; Nandi and Gamkhar, 2013).  
Criticisms that this agenda contained neoliberal elements (Banerjee-Guha, 2009; Kundu, 2014; 
Mahadevia, 2011; Mehta and Mehta, 2010) are borne out by scrutiny of national JNNURM 
documents. These encouraged cities to improve ƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ďĂŶŬĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ƚŽĞŶĂďůĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶ
through public-private partnerships4, and to free up property markets to promote the influx of 
private capital. Reducing stamp duty and the repeal of Urban Land Ceiling and Rent Control Acts 
ǁĞƌĞƚŚƵƐŬĞǇ ‘ƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ ?ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƵŶĚĞƌ:EEhZD ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƐĞůŽŶŐ-standing Acts were 
originally introduced to curb land speculation and keep rental property affordable for the urban 
poor. Cities were also pushed to levy user charges for the operation and management of urban 
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ?ƚƵƌŶƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇƚĂǆŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ŵĂũŽƌƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨƌĞǀĞŶƵĞĨŽƌhƌďĂŶ>ŽĐĂůŽĚŝĞƐ ? ?MHUPA, 
2009: 16), and cross-subsidise low income housing from private development projects. The 
implicit aim was that Urban Local Bodies would promote and effectively manage a local 
property boom, redirecting some of its benefits in favour of the urban poor.  
Other more progressive elements accompanied this view of state-managed trickle-down. There 
was a strong push towards ĚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ PŝŶĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚ/ŶĚŝĂ ?Ɛ ? ?th Constitutional 
Amendment, States were required to empower Urban Local Bodies as institutions of self-
                                                     
3 In the run-up to the 12th Five Year Plan (Planning Commission, 2013) there was a major review of the JNNURM as 
a whole, with JNNURM-//ŐĂŝŶŝŶŐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚĨƵŶĚŝŶŐĂŶĚďĞŝŶŐĞǆƉĂŶĚĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝŶŝƚŝĂů ? ? ‘ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĐŝƚŝĞƐ ?ƚŽƚŚĞ
whole of India. 
4 As the 2009 version of the BSUP guidelines state: 
 “dŚĞŵĂŝŶƚŚƌƵƐƚŽĨƚŚe revised strategy of urban renewal is to ensure improvement in urban governance so that 
Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) and para-statal agencies become financially sound with enhanced credit rating and 
ability to access market capital for undertaking new programmes and expansion of services. In this improved 
environment, public-ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŵŽĚƵůĞƐĨŽƌƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶŝŶŐŽĨǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐǁŽƵůĚĂůƐŽďĞĐŽŵĞĨĞĂƐŝďůĞ ?
(MHUPA, 2009: p.5) 
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governance5 with responsibility for city planning, and cities were required to institutionalise 
public participation at a grassroots level. The commitment to reducing urban poverty was 
enshrined by committing 35% of the total JNNURM budget to Basic Services for the Urban Poor 
(BSUP)6: BSUP in turn defined slum upgrade holistically, as ƐĞǀĞŶĐŽƌĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ “ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
ŽĨƚĞŶƵƌĞ ?ĂĨĨŽƌĚĂďůĞŚŽƵƐŝŶŐ ?ǁĂƚĞƌ ?ƐĂŶŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŚĞĂůƚ  ?ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?
(MHUPA, 2009). Although BSUP did not directly fund social services itself, its projects were 
required to show convergence with other service providers (MHUPA, 2009; see also Chatterjee, 
2013). The 2011 expansion of JNNURM attempted ƚŽ ‘ůŽĐŬŝŶ ?ƉƌŽ-poor elements ƚŽ^hW ?Ɛ
successor programme, the Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY) 7. Cities therefore had to ring-fence at least 
25% of their own budgets to address urban poverty; reserve a minimum proportion of housing 
within private developments for low income groups; provide lease rights for long-term slum 
dwellers; and develop municipal capacity for urban poverty alleviation and slum development. 
Debate over whether these were effective policy responses to either urban poverty or housing 
affordability in India continues (see Bhan et al. 2014 for a clear review), but here we focus 
ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŽŶ:EEhZD ?ƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƌelationships between 
city, State and national government they aimed to produce. The first was enacting a prescribed 
list of urban governance reforms, within which the establishment of empowered City-level 
governments was central. Eligibility for inclusion within the JNNURM was conditional on city 
and State governments signing a tripartite Memorandum of Understanding, committing them 
to a timetable for reform implementation (Siviramakrishnan, 2011). The second was the 
production of a City Development Plan, a vision document based on broad stakeholder 
participation, and integrating both poverty-alleviation and economic investment. This 
ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽ ‘ũŽŝŶĞĚƵƉ ?city-level thinking was strengthened further and given an explicit 
                                                     
5 This Constitutional Amendment made Urban Local Bodies a third tier of government under National and State 
(provincial) levels: passed in 1992, it required ratification and follow-up legislation by State Governments which 
ŚĂĚ ?ŝŶŵĂŶǇĐĂƐĞƐ ?ĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞƚŚŝƐďĞĨŽƌĞ:EEhZD ?ƐůĂƵŶĐŚ ?
6 dŚĞƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐ ? ?A?ǁĞŶƚƚŽ:EEhZD ?ƐŽƚŚĞƌ ‘ƐƵď-mission ? ?hƌďĂŶ/ŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĂŶĚ'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ, implemented 
by the Ministry for Urban Development.  
7  ‘ZĂũŝǀ ?'ĂŶĚŚŝ ?,ŽƵƐŝŶŐWůĂŶ ? PŶĂŵŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞĂĨƚĞƌ ŽŶŐƌĞƐƐWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƉĞƌŚĂƉƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽŝƚƐ
speedy replacement when Nirendra DŽĚŝ ?Ɛ:WĐĂŵĞƚŽƉŽǁĞƌŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? 
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poverty focus under JNNURM-II, where cities needed to develop a Slum Free City Plan of Action 
that rehabilitated existing slums and traced preventative action to tackle constraints on housing 
access for the urban poor. These plans required Ă ‘ǁŚŽůĞƐůƵŵ ?ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ?
considering livelihoods, social services and community assets in addition to delivering 
affordable housing. Engaging scheme beneficiaries was deemed essential within this: RAY 
expected their participation throughout the planning and delivery of housing projects, and that 
this would be institutionalised through setting up representative bodies for slum dwellers 
(MHUPA 2013a; 2013b; 2013c: see also Williams et al. 2017). Finally, eligibility to access 
:EEhZD ?Ɛconsiderable resources was conditional on co-funding from State and City 
governments8: housing projects also included a beneficiary contribution that was presented as 
giving slum dwellers a direct stake in their own re-housing. 
dĂŬĞŶƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƐĞ ‘ƌĞĨŽƌŵĞĚ ?ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞs suggested that city governments should embody 
certain ideals of statecraft. First, they should be legally and financially empowered as 
autonomous spheres of governance. Second, they should use this autonomy to govern 
strategically, with city visioning exercises making them entrepreneurial agents that promoted 
rapid economic growth and coordinated responses to poverty. Finally, within the latter, they 
should understand the causes of slum housing, and devise effective (and participatory) 
solutions to this.  
This vision of empowered municipal government clearly advocated a rescaling of governance in 
which States relinquished ĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŝƌĞƌƐƚǁŚŝůĞ ‘ǁĂƌĚƐ ?, but it also set in motion wider 
changes in relationships between cities, States and National government. As Sivaramakrishnan 
(2011a) notes, the central government funding available through JNNURM was an incentive for 
States and cities to embrace this vision. At the same, however, for JNNURM projects required 
cities and States to comply with an  ‘ŝŶǀĂƐŝǀĞ ?array of toolkits, planning documents and 
approval processes (Gopakumar, 2015) designed and monitored by New Delhi, thereby 
potentially undermining the city-level autonomy that was central to ƚŚĞDŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛstated 
                                                     
8 Percentage contributions from State and City governments were precisely stipulated, with larger cities making a 
greater contribution to costs: under JNNURM-II the level of central funding was reduced across the board. 
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purpose. In our conclusions, we return to these tensions between the explicit aims and 
embedded practices of JNNURM, and their broader implications for state rescaling. First, 
however, we look at their city-level effects within Trivandrum. How did the State and City 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐƐŚĂƉĞƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚǁŚŝĐŚŚŽƵƐŝŶŐƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐǁĞƌĞ
delivered, and with what effects? Did the City Development Plan and Slum Free City Plan of 
ĐƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ ‘ĐŝƚǇǀŝƐŝŽŶs ?ƚŚĂƚĐŚĂŶŐĞĚĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐ ?ŽƌƚŚĞƉůĂĐĞŽĨƉŽǀĞƌƚǇ
alleviation within them? Finally, how ĚŝĚ:EEhZD ?Ɛrequirements to ĚĞůŝǀĞƌĂďƌĞĂĚƚŚŽĨ ‘ĐŽƌĞ
ĞŶƚŝƚůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?^hW ) ?ŽƌĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽ ‘ǁŚŽůĞƐůƵŵ ?ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?Zz ) ?ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĞƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ
and design of slum redevelopment projects?  
3 Implementing JNNURM in Trivandrum 
3.1 Urban Governance Reform 
The governance reform and housing delivery agendas underlying BSUP and RAY seemed likely 
to find a receptive audience in Trivandrum. Kerala has a long history of independent action on 
urban poverty, with schemes from the 1970s onwards providing housing for the urban poor 
over and above national government support9. It had also wholeheartedly embraced 
ĚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞWĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐWůĂŶŶŝŶŐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?dŚŽŵĂƐ/ƐĂĂĐ
and Franke, 2000; Thomas Isaac and Heller, 2003). As a consequence, the core JNNURM 
condition of implementing devolved urban government had already been met, as Trivandrum 
Corporation had control over a range of functions matching /ŶĚŝĂ ?Ɛ 74th Constitutional 
Amendment. The Corporation has a Mayor-in-Council system, with directly-elected councillors 
representing each of its 100 Wards and participating in standing committees that oversee key 
policy areas (such as finance, development, health and education). The day-to-day 
management of many services, such as schools and primary healthcare, has been devolved to 
the Corporation, and elements of participatory democracy have been institutionalised: an 
                                                     
9 <ĞƌĂůĂ ?Ɛ ‘ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŚŽƵƐĞƐƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐůŝŶŬĞĚůĂŶĚƌĞĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽŚŽƵƐĞ-building for marginalised 
ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?ƉƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐŵĂŶǇ ‘ƚǁŽĐĞŶƚĐŽůŽŶŝĞƐ ? ?ŶĂŵĞĚĂĨƚĞƌƚŚ  ? ? ? ?th acre plots beneficiaries received: State-specific 
subsidies for land purchase and housing construction for the urban poor continued from this period.  
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annual round of public meetings discuss developmental priorities,10 and these feed into annual 
city expenditure plans and five-yearly review of these priorities (Plummer and de Cleene, 1999; 
George, 2006; Government of Kerala, 2002). In addition, from 1998 the State ?Ɛ Poverty 
Eradication Mission, Kudumbashree, had been given responsibility to undertake a range of 
national urban poverty alleviation measures ǁŝƚŚŝŶ<ĞƌĂůĂ ?ƐĐŝƚŝĞƐ ?11 Kudumbashree has gained 
international recognition for its women-based participatory approach (Williams et al., 2011), 
and potentially brought further support to inclusive urban governance through its extensive 
experience of community mobilisation and gender empowerment.  
Trivandrum therefore had some contextual advantages for delivering a pro-poor housing 
agenda, and the Government of Kerala moved quickly to capitalise on these through two high-
level actions: making <ƵĚƵŵďĂƐŚƌĞĞƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛnodal agency for BSUP schemes, and 
establishing a system of accrediting trusted NGOs to undertake construction within them. Both 
ǁĞƌĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽƐŚĂƉĞ<ĞƌĂůĂ ?Ɛimplementation of JNNURM housing programmes, 
ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚǁŚŝĐƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚ ?and using this to 
effect wider governance change. The first was a decision initially resisted by the State 
Kudumbashree Mission itself on the grounds that they did not have expertise in running large-
scale construction projects. The Mission ?ƐK also anticipated the political complexity of the 
role, and that Kudumbashree would not be undertaking it from a position of institutional 
strength.12 Nevertheless, the Government of Kerala insisted on the change:  
 “/ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůůǇĨĞĞů<ƵĚƵŵďĂƐŚƌĞĞǁĂƐŶŽƚŚĂƉƉǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶĂƚƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ ?ďƵƚŝƚǁĂƐ
ĐĂƌƌŝĞĚĂŶĚƉƵƐŚĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ? ? ?<ƵĚƵŵďĂƐŚƌĞĞ ?ƐƐŬŝůůŝŶŽƚŝŶĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶďƵƚǁĞƐĂŝĚ ‘EŽ ?
ƉŽǀĞƌƚǇŝƐŵŽƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŚĂŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƉĂƌƚ ? ? ? 
                                                     
10 /Ŷ<ĞƌĂůĂ ?ƚŚĞƐĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐ ? ‘tĂƌĚ^ĂďŚĂƐ ? )ĂƌĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚĂƚĂŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚƐĐĂůĞ W roughly equivalent to the 
area of a single polling booth. 
11 These included two earlier pro-poor housing programmes, the National Slum Development Programme (NSDP) 
and Valmiki Ambedkar Awas Yojana (VAMBAY), and an urban livelihoods programme, the Swarana Jayanthi 
Shahari Rozgar Yojana (SJSRY).  
12 JNNURM coincided with a contested internal reform of KuduŵďĂƐŚƌĞĞǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŐƌŽƵƉƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
ŝƚƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐǁŽƌŬ ?ƚŚĞDŝƐƐŝŽŶǁĂƐŵŽƌĞĐůŽƐĞůǇĂůŝŐŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƌƵƌĂů ?ŝƐƚƌŝĐƚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂŶƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐƉŽǁĞƌĨƵů
Mayoral structure (Interview, 17/01/16). 
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(Former SecretaƌǇƚŽ'Žǀƚ ?ŽĨ<ĞƌĂůĂ ?Ɛ>ŽĐĂů^ĞůĨ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ, 16/01/16) 
As this was a new area of work for Kudumbashree, seconded staff with relevant expertise (in 
ƚŽǁŶƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ?ĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌŝŶŐ ?'/^ĂŶĚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŵŽďŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ )ǁĞƌĞďƌŽƵŐŚƚƚŽĨŽƌŵĂ ‘^hW
Ğůů ?ǁithin the Mission ?Ɛ^ƚĂƚĞŽĨĨŝĐĞ PĂn equivalent Cell, physically located within Trivandrum 
ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŽĨĨŝĐĞƐ ?became the focal point for its JNNURM slum and housing activities.  
The system of accredited NGOs was established because of the complexity of these 
construction projects. Kudumbashree had had prior success in managing self-build housing 
schemes, particularly when working with rural councils and smaller municipalities (Former 
Kudumbashree CEO, 17/01/16), but the larger  ‘ǁŚŽůĞslum ? intervention projects envisaged 
within BSUP required professional building firms. By limiting these to accredited NGOs, 
Government of Kerala was directly challenging contractor-based corruption: 
 “tĞŬŶĞǁƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŝƐĂŶĂƌĞĂǁŚŝĐŚĞǀĞŶĂŐŽŽĚůŽĐĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ gets pulled away 
ŝŶƚŽĞŝƚŚĞƌŝŶĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇŽƌĐŽƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŽƌĐŽŵĞƐŝŶ ?^ŽǁĞǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽŐŝǀĞĂ
chance to clean local governments, so that their officials don't drag them to some kind of a link 
with the contractor. So  ? ǁĞĐĂŵĞŽƵƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨĂĐĐƌĞĚŝƚĞĚE'KƐ ? ?
 ?&ŽƌŵĞƌ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇƚŽ'Žǀƚ ?ŽĨ<ĞƌĂůĂ ?Ɛ>ŽĐĂů^ĞůĨ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )
An environmentally-sensitive architectural NGO was accredited first, followed by a limited 
number of other organisations. The former Secretary noted that the rigour of the vetting 
process had kept this list free from subsequent party-political interference. 
These decisions fixed the local institutional structure for implementing the BSUP, and later RAY. 
Accreditation of contractors allowed trusted NGOs to shape innovative housing projects:  at the 
same time, this challenged what several respondents described as entrenched corruption in 
large-scale public works centring arounĚdƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌŝŶŐĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?These 
projects were intended to provide a model of clean, participatory delivery that would kick-start 
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ƉƵďůŝĐĚĞŵĂŶĚĨŽƌƚŚŝƐƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞ ‘ŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵĞĚ ?ŝŶcity practice.13 ^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?<ƵĚƵŵďĂƐŚƌĞĞ ?Ɛ
selection as the state-level nodal agency for BSUP and RAY built on its previous involvement in 
other poverty alleviation programmes, but required its existing competence to be 
complemented by bought-in experts. Significantly for our focus on rescaling, the State 
Government drove these tactical choices for  ‘ƉƌŽ-ƉŽŽƌ ?housing delivery: we return the 
dynamics set in train by these choices below, but look first ĂƚdƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵ ?ƐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚ
the strategic planning envisaged under JNNURM. 
3.2: A pro-poor city vision? Planning within BSUP and RAY 
Like all municipal governments participating in JNNURM, Trivandrum was required to develop a 
City Development Plan (CDP) outlining its ŽǀĞƌĂůů ‘ĐŝƚǇǀŝƐŝŽŶ ? (Trivandrum Municipal 
Corporation, 2006). dŚŝƐĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ opening chapters provided an internally-coherent picture 
of Trivandrum using its existing strengths (healthcare, tourism, higher education, and an IT 
park) to focus development on high-tech industry and high-end services, ideas which were 
largely culled from an earlier planning exercise.14 Its closing chapters outlined ƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?Ɛ
pathway to full compliance with the governance conditionalities of JNNURM, highlighting that 
many mandatory reforms had already been undertaken, and providing a robust statement of 
dƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵ ?Ɛoverall fiscal health. Much like the World Bank ?Ɛ intentions for City Development 
Strategies of the time, this CDP therefore portrayed a city that ŝƐ ‘ůŝǀĞĂďůĞ ?ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞ ?ǁĞůů-
ŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚ ?ĂŶĚďĂŶŬĂďůĞ ? ?ƐĞĞZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?/ŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚese elements, plans for 
JNNURM investment were listed: these, and the bulk of the INR 74.2Bn (US$1.1Bn) requested 
from Central Government, focused on projects under :EEhZD ?ƐĐŽƌĞhƌďĂŶ/nfrastructure and 
                                                     
13 In practice, Kerala faced difficulties engaging good quality contractors for the even larger-scale projects 
undertaken under the Urban Infrastructure and Governance elements of JNNURM: attempts to get an agency 
accredited for road construction, for example, were unsuccessful (Former Secretary LSGD, 16/01/16). 
14 /ŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇƉƌŝŽƌƚŽ:EEhZD ?ƐůĂƵŶĐŚ ?dƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵŚĂĚďĞĞŶŽŶĞŽĨĨŝǀĞĐŝƚŝĞƐŝŶ<ĞƌĂůĂƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƐŝĂŶ
Development Bank funding for infrastructure development, and the CDP drew heavily on ideas from this (Govt. of 
Kerala, 2005) 
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Governance fund. A single, separate chapter provided analysis of urban poverty and staked 
dƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵ ?Ɛ claim for INR 5.77 Bn (US$89 million) of BSUP funding.15 
The BSUP chapter justified this figure through quick sketches of four case-study city slums, and 
the houses and supporting social infrastructure needed for their upgrade. From this, 
standardised estimates were used to calculate the investment required to rehabilitate all slum 
housing in the city. Both the budget figure itself and the identified target of delivering 6662 
formalised housing units were therefore deceptively precise quantifications of housing need 
and cost ƚŚĂƚŚŝĚĨĂƌŵĞƐƐŝĞƌůŽĐĂůĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽǀĞƌĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐĂŶĚƌĞĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ‘ƐůƵŵƐ ? ?First, 
these estimates were based on relatively large, contiguous areas of informal and under-
serviced housing. These are rare within the city, but seem to have been deliberately chosen to 
ĨŝƚĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝĚĞĂŽĨǁŚĂƚĂ ‘ƐůƵŵƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?ƐŚŽƵůĚůŽŽŬůŝŬĞ. Second, BSUP massively expanded 
the ĐŝƚǇ ?Ɛrecognised number of slums: a 1995 Department of Town and Country Planning 
survey had identified only 37 slums in Trivandrum, but the CDP recorded 355  ‘ƐůƵŵĐůƵƐƚĞƌƐ ?.
Many of these were smaller pockets of low-quality housing interspersed with areas of formal, 
serviced housing, a pattern far more typical of Trivandrum as a whole. Ward Councillors had 
been important in this change: 
Actually, that was a wrong approach, because it was within a timeframe that the City 
Development Plan had to be made, because they had to access funds ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ:EEhZD ?tĞ
asked the councillors to identify the slums, the elected members to identify the slums, and give 
us a list and they were not prepared to delete anything from that. 
(Former Chief Town Planner, Government of Kerala, 19/01/2016) 
                                                     
15 At 7.8% of TrivandrƵŵ ?ƐƉůĂŶŶĞĚJNNURM budget, BSUP projects were dwarfed by those proposed for transport 
(51.1%), sewerage (14.6%) and water (14.1%). There was, however, a significant overspend on BSUP projects, 
whereas Trivandrum struggled to implement fully these larger infrastructure projects (Former Secretary, Local Self 
Government Department, 16/01/16). 
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Ward Councillors clearly had strong incentives to ensure that their areas would potentially 
benefit from BSUP, and aided by a loose official definition ŽĨ ‘ŶŽƚŝĨŝĂďůĞƐůƵŵƐ ?,16 ƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ‘ƐůƵŵ
ĐůƵƐƚĞƌƐ ?ĞǆƉĂŶĚĞĚĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ. 
Knowledge of slum settlements was therefore sketchy in the CDP, but central to the Slum Free 
City Plan of Action (SFCPoA) that triggered follow-on funding under the Rajiv Awas Yojana 
(RAY). Strategies for preventing future slum formation were required in the SFCPoA , and 
dƌŝǀĂŶĚƵƌŵ ?ƐƉůĂŶbriefly discussed deploying RAY funding to create state-owned social-rented 
housing. This was, however, primarily a data-driven document as National RAY guidelines 
demanded a comprehensive slum survey mapping all city slums within a Geographical 
Information System. They also classified slums more precisely, based on eleven qualitative 
criteria that covered aspects of poverty, building quality and service access, all linked to 
settlement clusters of a minimum size and density. This in turn prompted extensive city-wide 
surveys and data-collection, coordinated by the Kudumbashree Mission, and drawing on the 
 ?ǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇ )ůĂďŽƵƌŽĨŝƚƐǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?dŚŝƐexercise roughly halved the 
number of recognised slum clusters in Trivandrum to 180, and although seemingly objective, it 
was a highly contentious act of classification, in which officials struggled to make national 
definitions meet local housing conditions and political realities: 
But the fact is that those habitations needed it [RAY housing support], I mean they were poor! ... 
It's just that they didn't have the characteristics then, so we would bend backwards to give an 
impression that these were.... You didn't have the density of populations. You didn't have any 
clear contours, but you still  ?called them 'colonies' and you know, you drew maps clustering 
these places, and there was a bit of gerrymandering happened there that you couldn't do 
anything about.  
(Former Kudumbashree CEO, 16/01/16) 
                                                     
16 ƐŶŽƚĞĚďǇ<ĞƌĂůĂ ?ƐĨŽƌŵĞƌĐŚŝĞĨƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐŽĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )ƚŚĞ<ĞƌĂůĂ^ůƵŵĐƚ ? ? ? ? ? )ŝƐĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ
defunct as it does not include clear enough rules to define slums. 
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RAY guidelines required an evaluation of ĞĂĐŚƐůƵŵ ?Ɛdemographic, physical and environmental 
vulnerability, linked to a resulting prescription for intervention (upgrade, in-situ rebuild, or 
relocation). This ranking exercise dominated dƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵ ?Ɛ SFCPoA as a whole, largely displacing 
deeper considered analysis of housing need and policy.   
It is important to ask what form of planning these documents contained. The CDP was 
essentially an updated amalgamation of previous investment plans completed as part of the 
WĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐWůĂŶŶŝŶŐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶƚŚĞůĂƚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐĂŶĚĨŽr Asian Development Bank-sponsored 
infrastructural investment, with the additional BSUP chapter estimating slum upgrade costs 
based around housing projects already under active consideration by the city.  Respondents 
recognised that this fell short of national expectations, but the need to produce this quickly and 
the presence of these earlier city-level plans meant that the construction of a document with 
the financial and technical detail requested by New Delhi was prioritised over a comprehensive 
visioning process.17 The more detailed national specification of the SFCPoA made this a much 
more demanding document to produce. The CŝƚǇ ?ƐZzProject Cell met its huge data collection 
requirements by ŵĂƐƐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ<ƵĚƵŵďĂƐŚƌĞĞ ?ƐŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚŐƌŽƵƉƐ, and handed 
over report writing to a consultancy firm.  
Respondents were clear that the CDP and SFCPoA were entirely separate from the production 
of a City Masterplan ďǇ<ĞƌĂůĂ ?ƐDepartment of Town and Country Planning, which establishes 
legal land use and development within the city. At best, BSUP/RAY produced projects that 
would be compliant with this Masterplan, but did not reshape statutory planning documents in 
any way. Both were also commissioned in parallel to the established annual developmental 
planning processes of <ĞƌĂůĂ ?ƐĚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƐĞĚůŽĐĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ, which link Ward-level meetings 
through to a city-wide spending plan. This lack of coordination was noted within a Central 
Government review of the CDP (ASCI, 2006) PdƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐe noted that 
                                                     
17  “zĞƐ ?ƚŚĂƚǁĞĐŽƵůĚĞĂƐŝůǇŐĞƚ ?ƚŚĞW ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁ ŚĂĚƚŚĞWeople ?ƐWůĂŶ ?/t ?s not a rigorous city 
development plan, it is a very loose kind of socio economic plan. Because we had this plan and we have a 
reasonably capable Town and Country Planning Department, we could get it [completed] faster ? ? ?&ŽƌŵĞƌ
Secretary LSGI, 16/01/16). 
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Ward Sabhas (public open meetings) had been used to consult on CDP content (TMC, 2006b), 
but this was a far cry from public participation driving a planning process.  
As such, neither document contributed to the development of <ĞƌĂůĂ ?Ɛurban policy, nor could 
they claim to represent stakeholders within Trivandrum. Emerging local urban challenges, such 
ĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ŚŝĚĚĞŶ ?ƉŽŽƌŚŽƵƐŝŶŐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨdƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵ ?ƐŐƌŽǁŝŶŐŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨůŽŶŐ-distance 
migrant labourers, were also ignored in both.18 Even within the narrower remit of a project-
focused planning exercise, however, both were somewhat devoid of spatial imagination. The 
CDP did not explain how leading sections of the high-tech economy and JNNURM-led 
infrastructural investments would intersect spatially, and had triggered nothing equivalent to 
ƚŚĞůŝŶŬŝŶŐŽĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ?ƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚƐƉĂƚŝĂůƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚǁŝƚŚŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚĨƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ/ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚ
Development Planning process (Harrison et al, 2008). The SFCPoA committed a parallel error: it 
pin-pointed slum clusters for a city-wide database, but ignored other relevant aspects of the 
ĐŝƚǇ ?ƐŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐĂƌĞĂƐŽĨƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐŚŽƌƚĨĂůů ?ƚŚĞĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĞƐŽĨƐůƵŵ-ĚǁĞůůĞƌƐ ?
livelihoods, or the distribution of government-owned land available for redevelopment. RAY 
sought  ‘ƐĞůĨ- ŝŶĂŶĐŝŶŐ ?slum redevelopment, whereby the private sector rehoused slum dwellers 
in return for commercial redevelopment of slum sites, supported by relaxation of planning 
controls. Regardless of this model ?Ɛ desirability, the SFCPoA did not provide a guide to where it 
could progress in practice. It remained a geo-referenced slum census, labelling housing clusters 
as needing government intervention, but detaching them from the rest of the life of the city.  
What both documents undoubtedly did achieve was to meet central government conditions for 
subsequent funding. The CDP lacked an account of its planned investments were integrated, 
but it did establish the City as competent and deserving of JNNURM funding: by placing the 
case for slum rehabilitation within this context, it paved the way for specific BSUP housing 
projects. Similarly, by deploying the resources of the city (and the labour of Kudumbashree 
neighbourhood groups) to good effect, the SFCPoA would undoubtedly have been used to 
                                                     
18 These labourers often rented rooms in formal, serviced housing but in overcrowded conditions: respondents 
estimated that their numbers had grown rapidly over the last decade (Former Secretary LSGI, 16/01/16; Former 
Mayor, 19/01/16). 
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justify a further series of central government-supported upgrade projects had the incoming 
national BJP government not suspended RAY in 2015. The risks of thiƐ ‘ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞĨŽĐƵƐĞĚ
ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ?ǁĞre that the considerable costs of producing these documents were lost once 
national policy moved on. Zz ?ƐǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂůmeant that there was no funding to implement the 
^&WŽ ?Ɛideas around state-owned rental housing stock (RAY Project Cell Member, 06/06/16).  
More broadly, the SFCPoA itself never received final approval from Delhi, and remained a draft 
document not in the public domain: as such, it was unable to stimulate a wider policy debate 
that outlived the particular programme it served. If there was a legacy here, it was in the CŝƚǇ ?Ɛ
capacity to produce future plans that responded to national programmes. Respondents noted 
that the experience of completing the SFCPoA, as well as elements of the document itself, 
would ease the ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ ‘,ŽƵƐŝŶŐĨŽƌůůWůĂŶŽĨĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ƚŚĞƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ
to trigger central government support under :W ?Ɛsuccessor programme to RAY, the Pradhan 
Mantri Awas Yojana.  
3.4: From plans to projects: tackliǯǮǯǫ 
Finally, we examine Trivandrum ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽ JNNURM ?Ɛ holistic aspirations of building 
sustainable communities, rather than merely rehousing slum dwellers. As noted earlier, the 
Government of Kerala had hand-picked NGOs to lead this activity, in part because a key NGO in 
this field had delivered 140 flats in a project in one of central TrivaŶĚƌƵŵ ?ƐůĂƌŐĞƐƚ ?ĂŶĚŵŽƐƚ
notorious, slums. Although this had ultimately suffered from severe problems of housing 
allocation,19 it provided a model of good urban design with innovative elements  W integrating 
good-quality housing with community infrastructure such as workspaces for micro-enterprises, 
study spaces, and anganavaadis (mother/child health centres)  W that were replicated within 
subsequent BSUP projects (Figure 1). A concerted push from the Mayor, the NGO and the 
Kudumbashree CEO was needed to ĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ of Urban Housing and Poverty 
ůůĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĂƉƉƌŽǀĞƚŚĞƐĞ ‘ĞǆƚƌĂ ? design elements, but Trivandrum ultimately won national 
                                                     
19 In a case reminiscent of housing project capture in South Africa (Miraftab, 2009), just before keys were to be 
handed over to the intended beneficiaries, the units were forcibly occupied by criminal groups, and distributed to 
their clients. This experience almost caused the NGO to disengage completely from urban housing programmes 
(Joint Director of Accredited NGO, 15/01/16).  
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awards for these projects (Former Mayor  ‘ ?: 20/01/16 and 06/06/16) and this experience may 
even have encouraged the Ministry ?ƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞin later iterations 
of BSUP and RAY.20   
[Figure 1 BSUP housing, Trivandrum approximately here] 
The combination of Kudumbashree and a committed NGO again came to the fore in responding 
to RAY ?Ɛ demands for greater community involvement in project design (MHUPA, 2013c). The 
city moved quickly to select a fishing settlement on the outskirts of Trivandrum as a potential 
site for in-situ redevelopment, and the RAY Project Cell rapidly engaged its community in what 
was presented as a reflective and innovative process. Respondents repeatedly mentioned a 
drawing competition organised through Kudumbashree in which children imagined their ideal 
house: this had been important in winning another national award, this time for beneficiary 
consultation.21 Trivandrum ?ƐƐƉĞĞĚŝŶresponding to these increased expectations of 
community-led design meant that this became one of only six RAY pilot projects across the 
whole of India to be approved for implementation before the incoming BJP government 
suspended the scheme in 2015. 
An optimistic reading would therefore see Trivandrum as engaging with, or perhaps even 
helping to drive, the evolution of national housing project design under JNNURM towards a 
 ‘ǁŚŽůĞƐůƵŵ ? approach with ever-greater community participation, and its capacity to do so 
emerging from sound, State-ůĞǀĞůĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚ<ƵĚƵŵďĂƐŚƌĞĞ ?ƐƌŽůĞĂŶĚE'KĂĐĐƌĞĚŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ. 
However, two other elements complicate this narrative somewhat. The first is the mismatch 
between the ĐĞŶƚƌĂůDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ?Ɛrequirements for project approval, and the possibility of genuine 
community-led design. Schemes had to be moved from proposals through to Detailed Project 
Reports for submission to New Delhi under acute time pressure: a two-week turn-around for 
                                                     
20  “ ?<ƵĚƵŵďĂƐŚƌĞĞK ?ƌĞĂůůǇĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚƚŚĞ ?D,hW ?^ecretary about the importance of these community 
facilities but later they included this very thing within RAY. Maybe these people are convinced and honest about 
this work and she convinced them and then onůǇǁĞŐŽƚŝƚƉĂƐƐĞĚ ? ? ?:ŽŝŶƚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨĐĐƌĞĚŝƚĞĚE'K ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ) 
21 Perhaps more substantively significant were public meetings whiĐŚŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĚĂŶĚƌĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŚĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?Ɛ
ƉůĂŶŶĞĚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƚŽƌĂŐĞƐƉĂĐĞĨŽƌĨŝƐŚĞƌŵĞŶ ?ƐĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ ?ĂĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŚĂůů ?ĂŶĚŵƵůƚŝƉůĞ
ƐĂĨĞƵƐĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŝƚĞ ?ƐůŝŵŝƚĞĚŽƉĞŶƐƉĂĐĞ ? 
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one BSUP project was cited (Joint Director of Accredited NGO, 15/01/16) and that for the RAY 
pilot project was completed in two months, a timeframe that worked against the participatory 
aspirations of all involved. Central government ?Ɛ project review was described as being 
extremely taxing, with a panel of high-level bureaucrats cross-examining plans. All respondents 
stressed that the City needed to present a detailed defence of the projects, with commitment 
and coordination from all actors involved. Whilst one ex-DĂǇŽƌĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚŚĞƌƐĞůĨĂƐ ‘ƐƚƵĚǇŝŶŐ
ĨŽƌƚǁŽĚĂǇƐƐŽůŝĚ ?(interview, 20/01/16) to understand the RAY guidelines and hand-picking 
engineers for the RAY cell to aid this process, it was not the intensity of this scrutiny, but its 
potential irrelevance that was a concern for others: 
It was not the total project, but ultimately the [building] design that they were interested in. 
That was what they were talking about and we would just have to sit and get our engineers to 
work and re-work the designs until they were satisfied.  
(Former Kudumbashree CEO: 17/01/16) 
This review focused attention on a  ‘product ?  W 30m2 one-bedroomed flats, compliant with 
national financial and technical norms  W rather than imaginative projects or modes of delivery. 
The second is the mismatch alluded to earlier between dƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵ ?ƐŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ of informal 
housing, and national policies that were increasingly funnelling resources into  ‘ǁŚŽůĞ slum ?
ƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐĐůĞĂƌůǇĨŽƌĐŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐŚĂŶĚwhen selecting housing projects: rather than 
prioritisation on the basis of housing need, as envisaged within BSUP guidelines, this was based 
around sites where government land was available for large-scale redevelopment. Such sites 
ǁĞƌĞƐŽůŝŵŝƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶ ?ƚeven scope for competition between Ward Councillors 
wishing to have projects located in their own constituencies:  
We have land in some areas only. Land purchasing is not easy  W the price is very high in our city. 
Central government will never spend a single paisa for purchasing land, so no problem. If they 
[Ward Councillors] are arguing [about project location] ?/ǁŝůůĂƐŬƚŚĞŵ ? ‘ŽǇŽƵŚĂǀĞůĂŶĚ ? ?
'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽƌƚŚĞŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŽǁŶůĂŶĚŵƵƐƚďĞƵƐĞĚ ? 
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(Former Mayor  ‘ ?: 19/01/2016)22 
Behind these award-winning flat-based projects, Trivandrum was far more quietly using 
JNNURM resources to meet its particular housing needs. As Table 1 shows, completed 
individual housing units (where beneficiaries were given subsidies to purchase land and 
organise construction themselves) far outstripped the volume of flats produced. The 
complications of flat-based projects, which in many cases directly resulted from the rushed 
process of drawing up Detailed Project Reports, led to delays in project implementation, which 
in turn created significant budget over-runs. The least dramatic of these was a three-fold cost 
increase for the  ‘ŐƌĞĞŶĨŝĞůĚ ?project illustrated in figure 1: flats in some in-situ redevelopment 
sites rose to 700% of the original proposed cost, an overspend Trivandrum Corporation met 
from its own budget.23 dŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽĚŽƐŽmight therefore be seen as a reputational 
investment  W to show itself as capable and deserving of Central Government support  W even 
though their physical impact on city-wide housing need was limited. 
[Table 1 here] 
4 Delivering Housing, Changing Governance? 
dƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵ ?Ɛslum improvement through JNNURM therefore presents a mixed record. A 
specialist BSUP/RAY cell provided a clear focus on project delivery, but meant that the housing 
ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐŚĂĚůŝƚƚůĞǁŝĚĞƌ ‘ƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŽŶĐŝƚǇŐŽǀĞƌŶĂ ĐĞ ?&ĂƌĨƌŽŵŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?Ɛ
analysis of urban poverty, the need to present projects as compliant with JNNURM norms 
produced changing and competing definitions of slums. Neither the City Development Plan nor 
the Slum Free City Plan of Action had any significant interaction  W in terms of inputs or outputs 
                                                     
22 Land scarcity not only supressed local party-political competition over particular project sites, it also appears to 
have dissipated potential tensions between the Communist-led Trivandrum Corporation and Congress leadership 
of the State Assembly (2011-16) over the RAY pilot project. Located in the Ward of a Congress councillor, the 
mutual advantage to the State and City of gaining this prestige national project seems to have ensured that there 
were no politically-motivated delays to its selection. 
23 All figures from BSUP Cell internal reports, discussed with ĂZzƉƌŽũĞĐƚĐĞůůŵĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵ ?Ɛ
willingness to ensure that cost over-runs did not lead to increased beneficiary contributions went beyond JNNURM 
expectations. It should be noted, however, that this did not protect residents from the high financial and personal 
costs of project delays.  
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 W with established processes of ƐƚĂƚƵƚŽƌǇůĂŶĚƵƐĞƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐŽƌƚŚĞĂŶŶƵĂů ‘ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ
ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ?ƌŽƵŶĚ ?&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƐŚŽǁ-case flat projects won national awards, the dominance 
ŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŚŽƵƐĞƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƚŽƚĂůŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĚǁĞůůŝŶŐƐĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚƐŚŽǁĞĚƚŚĂƚ:EEhZD ?Ɛ
aspiration to encourage participatory design of effective community-scale housing solutions 
remained elusive, not least because of the strictures of its own funding regime. That JNNURM 
had not provided the space for a basically well-run city with a modest housing need to become 
 ‘ƐůƵŵĨƌĞĞ ?ŝƐ ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ?ƵŶƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ ?tŚĞƌĞdƌŝǀĂŶĚ Ƶŵ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞis perhaps more revealing 
is in the detailed insights it provides inƚŽƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌ ?ƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨŚŽǁĂƌĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
projects of urban reform reshaping relationships between national, State and city-level 
governments. Here, the tensions and contradictions inherent within JNNURM policy set in train 
three inter-related dynamics of state rescaling based in turn around problem framing, 
technologies of governance, and the scalar strateŐǇŽĨĚƌŝǀŝŶŐƌĞĨŽƌŵ ‘ĨƌŽŵĂďŽǀĞ ? ?
The first dynamic is that of the national-scale framing of a policy problem, whereby JNNURM 
established prescriptive planning exercises, and delimited appropriate solutions to the 
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŽĨŵĂŬŝŶŐĐŝƚŝĞƐ ‘ƐůƵŵĨƌĞĞ ? ?The City Development Plan and Slum Free City Plan of 
Action required cities to present inevitably partial views of their current conditions and future 
development. These reflected back to central government the things it wanted to see, namely 
housing problems translated in to fundable projects, while squeezing out the space to 
represent local specificity and complexity. The increasingly detailed national guidelines for 
ƚŚĞƐĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐĂƉƉĞĂůĞĚƚŽĂďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚŝĐ ‘ǁŝůůƚŽŬŶŽǁ ? ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƌĞƐƚŝŶŐŽŶĂŶĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽn 
that if cities could be convinced to map the urban poor and their conditions more thoroughly, 
then housing problems would be rationally addressed. In practice, the Slum Free City Plan of 
Action became a straight-jacketed process of data collection: Trivandrum could meet its 
ĚĞŵĂŶĚƐďǇůŝƐƚŝŶŐŽƵƚŝƚƐƐůƵŵƐĂŶĚƌĂŶŬŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?ďƵƚƚŚŝƐƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇǇŝĞůĚĞĚ
little in the way of improved understanding. These planning exercises also had limited city-level 
institutional traction, even though they had revealed important local policy problems for our 
interview respondents. They had mapped the distribution ŽĨ ‘ƐůƵŵ ?ŚŽƵƐŝŶŐacross the city, 
raised awareness of the extent of urban poverty, and highlighted the vague and fluid official 
definitions underpinning both. Furthermore, they had pointed to city-specific issues (such as 
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long-ĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞŵŝŐƌĂŶƚůĂďŽƵƌĞƌƐ ?ƉŽŽƌŚŽƵƐŝŶŐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ )ĂŶĚƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƐŽŵĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĚĞďĂƚĞŽŶ
appropriate local solutions, such as using RAY funds to produce City-owned social-rented 
housing. However, this nascent debate was largely absent from the plan documents 
themselves, and was overtaken as national policy moved on: as our fieldwork progressed, wider 
discussions on urban development within the city were increasingly dominated bǇDŽĚŝ ?Ɛ
 ‘^ŵĂƌƚŝƚǇ ?ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ? 
These scalar effects of problem framing were not only present within broader city-visioning 
documents, but also shaped the form and selection of individual housing projects. National 
ambitions of finding  ‘ǁŚŽůĞƐůƵŵ ?ƐŽůƵƚŝons incorporating housing, social infrastructure and 
beneficiary participation grew from BSUP to RAY: as these were ĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶEĞǁĞůŚŝ ?Ɛ
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇĞǆĂĐƚŝŶŐĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ ?ƚŚĞƐĐŽƉĞĨŽƌůŽĐĂůĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚĞĚ ?&ŽƌdƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵ ?ƐZz
pilot project, these criteria were so demanding that no alternatives to the city-edge fishing 
community were seriously considered. This foreclosed any party-political competition over 
which Wards should benefit from such a sizable investment, showing the power of this 
national-level problem framing to dictate terms to a well-established and relatively 
autonomous city government. 
The second dynamic was that of technologies of governance, and their impact on governance 
capacity at a city scale. As we have shown, effective eŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚ:EEhZD ?ƐŐŽĂůƐǁĂƐĂ
significant challenge that prompted a coordinated State and City-level response. This drew on 
<ĞƌĂůĂ ?ƐĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚƌƵƐƚĞĚE'KƐĂŶĚŽǀĞƌƐŝŐŚƚĨƌŽŵ
<ƵĚƵŵďĂƐŚƌĞĞ ?ƐĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝŽƵƐK ?ďĂĐŬĞĚďǇƚŚĞƐŬŝůůƐŽĨƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚƐďƌŽƵŐŚƚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?Ɛ
BSUP/RAY Cell. Together, this produced a tight-knit team, but as one of the RAY Cell members 
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚ P ‘ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐǁĂƐƚŽĞŵƉŽǁĞƌƚŚĞhƌďĂŶ>ŽĐĂůŽĚŝĞƐ ?ďƵƚŝƚŶĞǀĞƌ
ŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚ ?ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨĞŵƉŽǁĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŵ ?<ƵĚƵŵďĂƐŚƌĞĞǁĂƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ? ?&ŽĐƵƐ
Group Discussion, 16/01/16). The dedicated BSUP/RAY cell fulfilled the immediate goal of 
gaining repeated funding of projects, but despite their aspirations were unable to effect wider 
change in tŚĞĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƉĂƌƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƚǇŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?dƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵ ?Ɛ:EEhZD
plans were legally and institutionally disconnected from existing city-level developmental or 
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statutory planning processes: the need to produce them, however, absorbed much of the 
ƚĞĂŵ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ?ůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞƚŚŝƐĚĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĨŽƌŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ?
dƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇǁĂƐďĞŝŶŐƌĞƐŚĂƉĞĚďǇƚŚĞĨĂƌŵŽƌĞŵƵŶĚĂŶĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚǁŚŝĐŚĐĞŶƚƌĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐĂƌĞ ‘ƐĞĞŶ ?ĂŶĚŵĂŶĂŐĞĚ PƚĞĐŚŶŝcal sanction, 
funding clearance, and evaluation based around physical progress of works and expenditure 
incurred. These practices are so deep-seated and unchanging that they were rarely questioned 
by any of the protagonists, but their cumulative effects were to close down the space for 
innovation and local autonomy within project delivery. 
dŚĞĨŝŶĂů ?ĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐ ?ĚǇŶĂŵŝĐĂƚƉůĂǇŚĞƌĞǁĂƐƚŚĂƚŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƐĐĂůĂƌ
strategy, which attempted to drive through broader governance reform  ‘ĨƌŽŵĂďŽǀĞ ? using the 
incentive of project-specific funding. ,ĞƌĞ ?dƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵ ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝŶďĞŝŶŐĂƚƚƵŶĞĚƚŽŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ƉŽůŝĐǇǁĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƵŶŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨĚƌŝǀŝŶŐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ‘ƵƉǁĂƌĚƐ ?ƚŽŶĞǁĞůŚŝ ?
through the energy it spent on demonstrating reform and project compliance, rather than 
 ‘ĚŽǁŶǁĂƌĚƐ ?ƚŽĐŝƚǇƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐ ?dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂĚŽƵďůĞŝƌŽŶǇŚĞƌĞ ?&ŝƌƐƚ ?ĂƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůŚŽƵƐŝŶŐƐƵďƐŝĚŝĞƐ
were reduced, and flat-based projects ran into costly delays, Trivandrum was committing ever 
more of its own resources to capture a diminishing national funding stream. Second, as central 
policy underwent repeated change, the real chances of a coherent and consistent city-level plan 
for slum improvement receded. Respondents were acutely aware of how hard it was to make 
Trivandrum fit to shifting national targets: for many of them, the JNNURM experience had 
highlighted the need for an urban policy for Kerala, but none felt that this significant absence at 
the State-level would be filled soon.  
This is an important reminder that we should expect that the geographies of state rescaling 
within post-ůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ/ŶĚŝĂƚŽďĞĐŽŵƉůĞǆĂŶĚƉůƵƌĂů ?ǀĞŶǁŝƚŚŝŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŽĨ ‘ĚĞŵĂŶĚ
ƐŝĚĞ ?ƌĞƐĐĂůŝŶŐ ?ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇĞǆƉĞĐƚƚŚĂƚ/ŶĚŝĂ ?Ɛ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂƌĞƚŚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƉůĂǇĞƌƐŝŶ
resolving the tensions Vijayabaskar (2017) identified between attracting capital investment, and 
building political legitimacy through welfare provision. JNNURM attempted to reform city-level 
governments and enable them to chart their own strategic paths towards urban development, 
promoting economic growth whilst addressing urban poverty. The contradictions inherent 
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within this self-conscious project of rescaling have, instead, ensured that any such 
empowerment was highly curtailed and that the national state continues to play a key role in 
shaping the practices of urban governance. 
These three dynamics of state rescaling in turn raise wider challenges for both academics and 
ƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬĞƌƐĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŽƚĂŬĞƵƉ^ŚĂŬƚŝŶĂŶĚsŝĚǇĂƌƚŚ ?ƐĐĂůůƚŽĞŶŐĂŐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚŝĞƐŽĨ
urban governance change in contexts such as post-liberalisation India. For academics, the 
challenge is that this engagement requires research that is itself multi-scalar in its reach. Some 
ƌĞĐĞŶƚƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŽƌƐƚŽ^ŚĂŬƚŝŶĂŶĚsŝĚǇĂƌƚŚŝ ?ƐĐŽllection itself) have 
ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚƵƌďĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŵŽǀĞƌƐĂŶĚƐŚĂŬĞƌƐ ? ?ƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌĨƵů
elites at national and State/city level able to shape policy or developmental visions. 
Understanding these people and their agendas provides an important counter-weight to 
qualitative work on urban poverty that has often privileged the polar opposite approach, 
namely looking through the eyes of grassroots participants at policy outcomes. However, we 
would argue for research questions and methodologies that deliberately cross scales, following 
processes and documents from national policy guidance through to specific project delivery. In 
our case, this has helped us move beyond policy evaluation, the focus of much JNNURM 
research thus far, to understĂŶĚdƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵ ?ƐƐĐŽƉĞĨŽƌƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
policy, and the limitations to this. More broadly, this re-emphasises the tensions between 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƐĐĂůĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŝŶĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƐĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞŐůŽďĂů^ŽƵƚŚǁŚĞƌĞ “ƌĞƐĐĂůŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ?
appĞĂƌƚŽďĞŵŽƌĞƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇƐŚĂƉĞĚďǇƐƚĂƚĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽŵĂƌŬĞƚĨŽƌĐĞƐ ? ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?
2017: 20). Here, we have presented problem framing, technologies of governance and scalar 
strategies as three inter-related dynamics of rescaling that may help scholars to unpack and 
understand these tensions elsewhere. 
For policy makers, however, any such understanding is primarily of value insofar as it suggests 
ways in which the goals of autonomous, empowered city government Manmohan Singh 
ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚĂƚ:EEhZD ?ƐůĂunch might be realised in practice. Although we can offer no 
roadmap for change here, we can offer both hope and caution. Hope is to be found in 
dƌŝǀĂŶĚƌƵŵ ?Ɛ willingness to engage with these goals, where it was clear that local policy makers 
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saw JNNURM as ĂŶŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ<ĞƌĂůĂ ?ƐŽǁŶƌĞĨŽƌŵƚƌĂũĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?dŚĞƐĞĂƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
could have been more fully realised had JNNURM promoted more meaningful dialogue with 
New Delhi on building cross-scalar pathways and alliances towards empowered urban 
governance, rather than simply requiring cities to react to a centralised agenda. Our caution is 
therefore directed at those shaping national urban policy, and would follow directly from 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ ‘ƌĞƐĐĂůŝŶŐŝƐŶŽƚĂǌĞƌŽ-ƐƵŵŐĂŵĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?Ever-more 
prescriptive guidelines reinforced by funding conditionality may appear to be the strongest 
weapons in the policy armoury, but reaching instinctively for these inevitably recentralises 
power, even when it is done in the name of devolution. Furthermore, any such unintended acts 
ŽĨ ‘ƌĞƐĐĂůŝŶŐƵƉǁĂƌĚƐ ?carry the additional risk of weakening governance capacity at all levels of 
the state. 
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Table 1: BSUP Housing Delivery, Trivandrum 
 Individual Self-built Units Project-built Units (Flats)  
Sanctioned 10,891 1,621 
Commenced 8,941 881 
Completed 7,884 651 
Withdrawn 0 358 
  
Source: BSUP Internal Report, Accessed 31/01/17 
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Figure 1: BSUP housing, Trivandrum, with mother/child health centre in foreground 
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